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Human Rights Yearbook / Vol. 1
NICARAGUA: United States Assistance to the Nicaraguan Human Rights
Association and the Nicaraguan Resistance
The question of providing aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance has been
significant to United States human rights policy throughout the Reagan Administration. Although events have changed repeatedly during
the winter of 1988, including a truce between the Nicaraguan Government and the Resistance and a Congressional decision not to provide
military aid to the Resistance, the underlying policy issues remain
constant. The Harvard Human Rights Yearbook presents two notes,
infra, discussing the Military Construction Appropriations Act of
1987, which granted $100 million in aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance. The first note discusses the Nicaraguan Human Rights Association (Asociacidn Nicaraguense Pro-Derechos Humanos "ANPDH"), a
human rights organization sponsored and funded by the United States.
The second note discusses the content, legislative history and human
rights concerns of the 1987 Appropriations Act.
I.
A notable result of the 1987 Military Construction Appropriations
Act's grant of aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance is the creation of a
new United States-sponsored human rights organization, the Nicaraguan Human Rights Association (Asociaci6n Nicaraguense Pro-Derechos
Humanos: "ANPDH"). Funded by $2.5 million of the $3 million
earmarked in section 208 of the Act "for strengthening programs and
activities of the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance for the observance
and advancement of human rights,"' the group began work in October
1986 independent of other local and international human rights monitoring organizations. Its primary objectives, as developed by the
United States Department of State, are the prevention and investigation of human rights abuses by the Nicaraguan Resistance as well as
gathering information on Sandinista abuses. 2 Its goal generally is "the
defense of human rights under international law, within the context
1. Military Appropriations Construction Act of 1987, PUB. L. No. 99-591 § 208, 100 Stat.
3341 (1986) [hereinafter Military Construction Act]; see also NICARAGUAN HUMAN RIGHTS
ASSOCIATION (ANPDH), SECOND SIX-MONTH REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES BY THE

NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE 31 (1988) (explaining the ANPDH's funding) [hereinafter SECOND
REPORT].

2. U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR

1986, at 584 (1987) (hereinafter 1986 COUNTRY REPORTS]. The ANPDH is also responsible
for a "comprehensive human rights instruction program for resistance combatants." Id. In
addition, the State Department report states that the ANPDH staff has visited prisoners of the
Democratic National Front ("FDN") and are "actively seeking an international organization to
assist in returning them to Nicaragua or to other nations willing to accept them." Id Country
Reports refers to the ANPDH as the Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights ("NAHR")
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of the continuing conflict between the Sandinista government of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Resistance." 3 Incorporated in Costa Rica,
the ANPDH has offices in Honduras and a representative in Washington, D.C. Its trained observers follow the resistance forces with
varying degrees of success on the Atlantic, Southern and Northern
fronts of Nicaragua.
The development of the ANPDH reflects the increased concern of
United States legislators over funding the Nicaraguan armed resistance
in light of human rights abuses reported by American journalists and
national and international monitoring organizations. 4 President Reagan's 1986 request for Contra aid highlighted the $3 million specified
for human rights funding as reflecting the "determination that human
rights must be respected." The President optimistically predicted
"significant positive results" from human rights training and assistance. 5 However, Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs, acknowledged congressional concerns about Contra
human rights abuses when discussing the human rights funding:
"There is no question that there have been human rights violations by
the resistance forces. It is a guerrilla army, and that is a difficult
'6
situation in which to discipline troops.
The ANPDH's predecessor, the United Nicaraguan Opposition's
Human Rights Commission ("UNO/CDH"), was also created to investigate charges of human rights abuses by the resistance forces.
During operations from December 1985 to July 1986, the UNO/
CDH's objective, as designated by the State Department and the
President, was to defend and promote human rights, particularly in
situations of armed conflict. 7 During its existence, the Costa Ricabased organization spent $175,000 of United States funds and rec3.

NICARAGUAN HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION (ANPDH), SIX-MONTH REPORT ON HUMAN

RIGHTS IN THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE 3 (July 1987) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT].
4. See generally AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA 1986 (1987) [hereinafter
AMEICAs WATCH 1986]; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT 1986 (1987) [hereinafter AmNESTY 1986]; LAWYERS COMMITTEE

FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA:

1987 (1987) [hereinafter LAYER COMM. 1987].
5. See Assistance for Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Appropriations,99th Cong., 2nd Seas. at 288 (1986) (press release of President Reagan).
6. U.S. Policy TowardNicaragua:Aid to NicaraguanResistance Proposal:Hearingsbefore the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986) (statement of Elliot Abrams, Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs). Even with the allocation of human rights funding,
the Contra aid bill barely passed the Senate Appropriations Committee in August 1986, by a
15-14 vote. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1986, at A4, col. 4.
7. Directed by Arturo Cruz, one of the UNO's principal leaders at that time, with assistance
from Ismael Reyes, the former head of the Nicaraguan Red Cross, the UNOICDH's tasks
included training UNO forces in a code of conduct, investigating and monitoring punishment
of derelictions and monitoring and exposition of Sandinista human rights violations. See Assistance
for NicaraguanDemocratic Resistance. Hearings before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
99th Cong. 2nd Sess. 323 (1986).
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ommended twenty-one prosecutions. Only one of the nineteen cases
resulting in convictions reported in the 1985 State Department Country
Reports involved violence against Nicaraguan civilians. The remainder
concerned either common crimes or abuses against other Contras. 8
The same obstacles that blocked access by the UNO/CDH to key
individuals and information regarding human rights in Nicaragua also
hamper the ANPDH. In reporting on the office's closure, the State
Department indicated that the UNO/CDH was unable to gain access
to evidence, witnesses and sites of alleged abuses, and therefore failed
to establish an objective basis for confirming or rebutting the charges
disseminated by the Nicaraguan government. 9 Although the ANPDH
initially reported that the armed resistance was receptive to its inquiries and programs, 10 it later faced the same tensions with Contra
commanders as did the UNO/CDH. 11 The trend toward conflict has
reyersed somewhat with structured talks between the ANPDH and
resistance leaders and organizational changes in the military prosecutor's office, but the underlying problems of securing witnesses and
access to sites remain.12
Unlike the UNO/CDH, the ANPDH is meant to be separate and
independent from the political and military components of the Resistance. 1 3 ANPDH's director, Marta Patricia Baltodano, formerly di8. See AMERIcAS WATCH 1986, supra note 4, at 50. According to Americas Watch, its
"flawed performance made UNO/CDH something of an embarrassment." Id. at 146.
9. See 1986 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 2, at 584.
10. Id.
li. See N.Y. Times, June 2, 1987, at A16, col. 1. The article reported that according to
senior rebel officials and diplomats, Contra military commanders had blocked human rights
monitors from visiting prisoners in rebel jails. Id. Just one month earlier, Assistant Secretary
Abrams asserted that the ANPDH and other efforts "have made clear beyond doubt the
democratic commitment of the Nicaraguan resistance." Abrams, Development of U.S. -Nicaragua
Policy, DEP'T ST. BULL., May 1987, at 78. A March 1987 House Report on Nicaragua explained
that with regard to human rights, the Nicaraguan resistance continues to be "tarred with a poor
image, arising in part from Sandinista efforts to discredit it falsely." The report goes on to state
that the resistance has demonstrated its willingness to assist NAHR investigations. J.E. Fox,
FURTHER ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUAN DEMoCRATIC RESISTANCE, H.R. Doc. No. 100, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1987) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
12. SEcoND REPORT, supra note 1, at 3, 5-6.
13. The House Report on Nicaragua, pursuant to Sections 211(e) and 214 of the Military
Construction Act of 1987, supra note 1, details the status of negotiations between the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance and the Nicaraguan government and evaluates the human rights situation
there. The House Report identifies the efforts of the ANPDH (referred to there as the NAHR),
noting that the organization is non-profit and "separate and independent from any of the
resistance's political or military components." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11. at 9. The Americas
Watch report Human Right in Nicaragua 1986 indicates a conflict of views on the distinct nature
of the ANPDH. Contrary to ANPDH leaders' assertions of their independence from UNO, a
State Department official in comments to Americas Watch in September 1986 "took it as a
given that the new office would be established precisely as a successor to UNO/CDH." AMERICAS
WATCH 1986, supra note 4, at 51.
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rected the Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights
("CPDH"). 14 Two staff members, however, were with UNO/CDH. 15
The ANPDH functions primarily to provide human rights training,
investigate abuses and serve as a liaison with international organizations. Since its creation, it has issued two Six-Month Reports discussing
the group's findings in many areas: training programs, methodology,
the association's limitations, individual case investigations, the resistance code of conduct, military prosecution in the Resistance, treatment of prisoners and allegations of Sandinista human rights violations. 16 Conclusions to the reports recognize both significant
achievements in human rights training efforts and disappointment
with the slow progress to establish an effective military prosecuting
mechanism. The second report recognizes that "the Association's goals
are still beyond the steps that (it has] been able to achieve." More
positively, it notes that "corrective structures have begun to impede a
7
pattern of mistreatment and abuse."'
The ANPDH highlights training as a major accomplishment, yet
concludes that lack of training and proper military discipline is the
root of many of the Resistance's human rights problems. As of January
1988, the Association had trained more than 1,875 individuals, about
ten percent of the force, in over thirty-three courses and seminars for
commanders, troops and observers. Trainees are instructed in registering allegations, conducting investigations and motivating their
companions to respect human rights. '8 Courses focus on the protection
of the civilian population, treatment of wounded, protection of the
Red Cross and its units, prohibitions against torture, limiting indiscriminate use of weapons and eliminating the forceful recruitment of
civilians.' 9 The observers, who are encouraged to teach human rights
14. The Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH"), founded in 1977,
is a non-governmental organization not affiliated with any political party or religious group. It
collects and disseminates data on human rights abuses filed in formal complaints at its office
and has disseminated reports of its findings. U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NICARAGUA UNDER THE SANDINISTAS 3, 5 (Dec. 1986).
15. FIRST REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
16. Id. at 6.
17. SECOND REPORT, supra note 1, at 29-30. The FIRST REPORT states that:
[Miany of the Nicaraguan Resistances human rights problems stem from a singular

lack of training and proper military discipline. Although it is too early to tell, the
Association believes there is already an indication that human rights violations on the
part of the Nicaraguan Resistance may be on the decline. But if that is true, it can
only continue as long as the Nicaraguan Resistance takes serious steps to establish a
more effective military prosecuting mechanism. So far, progress has been slow.
FIRST REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
18. SECOND REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.

19 Id., FIRST REPORT. supra note 3, at 4. All observer/activists and combatants are given
material including the "Combatant'i Manual, Ru/es Concerning the Treatment of the Civilian Popu-
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in their daily contact with combatants, receive intensive refresher
courses "so they can continue to integrate the responsibilities of combat
20
with those of being members of a human rights working group."
The Code of Conduct, with which resistance fighters and observers
are trained, has undergone substantial revisions since the Nicaraguan
Democratic Force ("FDN") first published the Blue & White Book, the
first version of the military code of conduct, in 1982. In December
1987, the resistance directorate officially promulgated a new, more
simply written code, following a conference with participation from
several FDN commanders, including General Commander Enrique
21
Bermudez.
Both reports recognize basic limitations which persist in the Association's training and investigatory efforts. First, the Sandinista government's refusal to grant permission to conduct investigations inside
Nicaragua hampers ANPDH fact-finding efforts by limiting access to
witnesses and sites of abuses. 22 Second, relatively low education levels
of combatants make the training process more difficult and less effective. Although "most of the combatants express strong support for
human rights concepts, they need recurrent instruction to convert such
feelings into useful habit patterns that will serve them in combat,"
according to the first report. 23 Third, lack of cooperation by resistance
commanders interferes with the ANPDH's work. The initial cooperation between the FDN and the ANPDH wore thin within a few
months, resulting in the temporary eviction of ANPDH staff from
the Contras' northern front headquarters. 24 While the ANPDH returned to the front, frictions remain, stemming from regional commanders' fears that observers threaten their power and might also
uncover evidence of pre-ANPDH abuses denied by the Resistance. 2'
lation, the military Code of Conduct, and a summary of the Geneva Conventions and applicable
protocols." SECOND REPORT, supra note 3, at 4. The first report notes that a radio version of
the combatant's manual was prepared for broadcast from rebel stations. That report highlights
the ANPDH's "special attention" to training ethnic groups, including Miskitos and Creoles,
represented in the resistance, FIRST REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
20. SECOND REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.

21. Id. at 25.
22. Id. at 5; FIRsT REPORT, rupra note 3, at 5.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id. ANPDH staff was ordered to leave by the Contras' chief military commander Enrique
Bermudez on May 14, 1986. The commanders charged that the human rights monitors, who
are mainly civilians, "interfered with the military chain of command" in investigating abuses,
according to two senior rebel officials quoted in the New York Time. N.Y. Times, June 2, 1987,
at A16, col. 2. See also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
25. The first Report states the Association's belief that part of the crisis stemmed from the

ANPDH's decision to investigate violations which occurred several years ago. The Resistance
also initially objected to the presence of civilian observers, claiming the observers interfered
with combat operations. However, the Report also notes that the Nicaraguan Resistance "is
probably the only revolutionary movement that allows human rights monitors within its ranks-
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The Second Six-Month Report notes, however, that the friction between
the Contras and the ANPDH has "substantially diminished with the
creation of the legal counsel, which also functions as a liaison between
the ANPDH and the resistance leadership." 26 Finally, the constantly
changing position of resistance bases and corresponding difficulties in
location of observers
transportation to those areas have impeded the
27
and witnesses among the decentralized forces.
Despite its acknowledged limitations, the ANPDH includes in its
first report twelve investigations with findings varying in completion,
eight other specific cases under investigation and two general areas of
concern: misconduct outside Nicaraguan territory and indiscriminate
land mine use. 28 Allegations include murders, forced recruitments,
kidnappings, arson and rape. 29 The ANPDH referred four cases to
prosecutors for further investigation and action, stating that several
other investigations are incomplete, pending additional testimony. In
kidnapping cases the ANPDH requested FDN officials to free the
captives. One of the twelve investigations led to sexual abuse charges
brought by the ANPDH against Comandante Mike Sierra, chief of
staff of KISAN, the Miskito Indian/Creole alliance. However, the
findings report that, "inexplicably," Sierra was released before having
30
been tried.
The second report follows up on seventeen previous cases. Only one
fully satisfies the ANPDH's criteria for a complete investigation.
Reports on the other sixteen cases are partial at best, with problems
ranging from incomplete investigations due to the inaccessibility of
witnesses, evidence and sites to short sentencing to sentences not being
served by guilty parties. The ANPDH also notes a lack of responsiveness by and negligent handling of cases by KISAN and YATAMA
(Children of the Motherland of the Atlantic Coast, an indigenous
people's alliance). 31 Significantly, in six of the investigated cases, the
32
ANPDH reports the sentencing of convicted human rights violators.
The second report describes the six investigations conducted by the
ANPDH in the past six months. Five investigations were resolved
satisfactorily. 33 One, in which an alleged Sandinista informer was
for ideological reasons identified with its democratic principles and objectives, and because of
the source of the funds for resistance operations." FIRST REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
26. SECOND REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
27. Id. at 6.
28. FIRsT REPORT, supra note 3, at 24-25.
29. id. at 7-22.
30. Id. As of January 1988, Sierra remains an active Comandante and faces no charges.
SECOND REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
31 SECOND REPORT, supra note 1, at 8-18.
32. Id. at 8-20.
33 Id. at 18-20.
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excecuted following a military trial at the Southern Front, the Assohumanitarian law of war; as such
ciation held to be a violation of the
34
it should be the subject of a trial.
The twenty-two other cases listed in the second report as new
allegations of human rights abuses committed by the Contras have
not yet been fully investigated. The ANPDH is investigating attacks
on cooperatives, attacks against civilians and the indiscriminate use of
arms against the civilian population. 35 The ANPDH condemns government placement of military structures within rural cooperatives
because such locations "competl] displaced peasants to become in,36
volved in military activities ....
Both ANPDH reports include suggestions to increase the Resistance's respect for human rights. The first report recommends that
the National Resistance leadership take "serious steps to establish a
more effective military prosecuting mechanism." 37 The ANPDH's
examination offiscalia (the military prosecutors office) uncovered malfunctions in the structure of prosecutions of Code of Conduct violations
by resistance members. In July 1987, the Resistance reorganized the
fiscilia following the structure of the Northern Front legal counsel
which oversees thefiscilia. The office has two lawyers, one which serves
as a prosecutor before the military tribunals and the other as a defense
counsel. Upon receiving an allegation of a human rights abuse, the
Northern Front Commander orders a preliminary investigation with
the legal counsel which determines whether to bring the accused to
trial. The Northern Front Commander then forms a military tribunal
with three regional, task force or group commanders. The accused is
suspended and arrested if necessary once the trial begins. Prosecuting
and defense lawyers are present from the initial stages. Following a
thirty day proof-gathering period, the prosecutor and defense attorney
present final arguments and the tribunal issues a judgment and sen38
tence according to the guidelines in the Code of Conduct.
The Atlantic and Southern Fronts still have an "urgent" need for
an operating military prosecutor's office, according to the second
report. 39 The YATAMA group, which includes the former KISAN
front, has committed several grave and unpunished violations in the
area. The disciplinary system utilized in the two fronts corresponds
40
neither to the Code of Conduct nor many accepted legal principles.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 21.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
FIRST REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
SECOND REPORT, iupra note 1, at 6-7.
Id. at 6
Id.
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Regarding prisoners, the number of Sandinistas captured by the
Northern Front jumped from seventy-two in July 1987 up to 131 in
that September and down to sixty-two in January 1988. The ANPDH
reported its protest to the resistance directorate regarding cramped jail
conditions at an old Northern Front strategic command base. It continues to investigate reports of physical threats and alleged participation of resistance intelligence personnel and military police in torture
during interrogations. The Association's efforts in these areas and in
seeing prisoners not registered on any official list but generally known
to be held by the Resistance "have met with little success. '4 1 The
second report notes that the military police it has seen treat prisoners
42
reasonably well but that medical care is neither sufficient nor timely.
The ANPDH has become involved with Nicaraguan refugees in
Honduras and Costa Rica by volunteering to serve as an intermediary
in talks between Nicaraguan refugees, the UN High Commission for
Refugees ("UNHCR"), the International Red Cross and civil and
military authorities. 43 The Association visits various refugee centers,
monitors the condition of Nicaraguan refugees and supports compliance with the conventions of repatriation signed between the govern44
ments of Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Honduras and the UNHCR.
Several non-governmental human rights organizations, including
the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Americas Watch,
criticize the ANPDH's effectiveness as a human rights investigatory
and training operation. 45 Americas Watch cites its disappointment
with ANPDH investigations specifically following its own investigation of allegations of murder of civilians by resistance forces, including
children, in the Nicaraguan town of El Nispero. 46 The Lawyers Committee on Human Rights report, Human Rights in Nicaragua: 1987,
similarly criticizes the ANPDH's accomplishments in investigating
and reforming human rights abuses in Nicaragua. 47 The Lawyers
41. Id. at 50.
42. Id. at 26.
43. Id. at 27.
44. Id. at 29.
45. Seegenerally LAWYERS COMM. 1987, upra note 4; AMERICAS WATCH 1986, supra note

4.
46. Only after Americas Watch wrote to Dr. Adolfo Calero with its contrary view of the
facts
and published a statement that the ANPDH investigation "yielded results which tend to
rationalize Contra behavior--and deny abuses-rather than to seek the perpetrators of the
murders and kidnappings," AMERIcAS WATCH 1986, supra note 4, at 53, did the ANPDH
publish an acknowledgment of these inaccuracies. FiRST REPORT, smpra note 3, at 16. As of the
July 1987 report, its investigation of the November 1986 El Nispero attack remained incomplete.
47. With respect to the published case investigations, the report stated that the ANPDH
had "barely scratched the surface of credible reports of Contra human rights abuses." LAWYERS
Comm. 1987, supra note 4, at 36. Regarding the Contras internal justice system to which the
ANPDH refers certain cases, the Lawyers Committee found no evidence that the system operates,
despite the Contras public statements of its existence.
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Committee doubts the impact of ANPDH training programs, concluding that "the ANPDH has even less to show for itself as a training
unit than an investigatory body. Most of the incidents of Contra abuses
uncovered in a week of travelling through conflicted areas occurred
between May and July of this year (1987). Other incidents continue
48
to be regularly reported in the press."
In contrast to criticisms by non-governmental organizations, the
State Department lauds the ANPDH's accomplishments. Assistant
Secretary Abrams cites the ANPDH and other Nicaraguan human
rights initiatives as having "given the resistance the tools it needs to
49
project its democratic message to Nicaragua and to the world.'
In addition to restricted access to information, its role as an organization politically and legally necessary for continued aid to the
Contras hampers the ANPDH's effectiveness. The fact that the
ANPDH named only forty-five individual cases of Contra abuses in
contrast to 122 cases of Sandinista abuses, when its primary objective
is to monitor the Contras, may be partially explained by examining
the ANPDH's role within the power dynamic of the President, Congress, the United States public and the Nicaraguan opposition. The
ANPDH is a legally mandated component of the Administration's
policy of continued Contra funding. In effect it is an organization
funded by the United States to grant a human rights stamp of approval
so that money can be supplied with a clear political conscience. It
seems unlikely that such an organization could be effective. Because
the United States administration has consistently demonstrated its
willingness to supply the Contras, the ANPDH possesses little real
power, like the capacity to make threats to withhold aid, with which
to influence its intended audience. It could conceivably make a major
commitment to investigate and publicize abuses in order to expand
its influence over the Contras but it has not yet shown an ability or
inclination in this area.
Even if the ANPDH were determined to pursue its mandate on a
large scale, questions remain regarding the potential impact of human
rights training of any group dedicated to guerilla warfare. The
ANPDH's trainings may increase Contra awareness of human rights
laws of warfare. However, the very nature of their efforts-teaching
consciousness about human rights to cadres of guerillas-makes a high
degree of success unlikely.
Furthermore, it is ironic that the ANPDH is instructing the Contras
to comply with international guidelines for conducting guerilla warfare

48. Id. at 37.

49.

DEP'T ST. BuLL., supra note 11. at 781.
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when the World Court held that support to the Contras constituted
"a clear breach" of the principle of non-intervention. 50
Despite criticisms and its limitations, the ANPDH remains a critical component of United States policy in Nicaragua. For as long as
Congress remains concerned about human rights violations by the
Contras, the ANPDH or some similar organization will be politically
necessary to justify continued funding to the Nicaraguan Resistance.
II.
5
The Military Construction Appropriations Act, ' enacted on October 30, 1986, as part of an Omnibus Appropriations Bill, includes
among its many provisions authorization for the release of
$100 million in military and humanitarian aid to Nicaraguan oppo52
sition military and paramilitary forces known as Contras. The Act,
for which President Reagan personally and persistently lobbied, has
been described as a major victory for Reagan foreign policy
53
objectives.
Title II of the Act provides funds for the Contras and authorizes
the release of Defense Department funds for assistance to "the Central
American democracies. '54 Section 206 of Title II, "Assistance for the
Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance" begins the portion of the Act
which authorizes aid to the Contras. Section 211(b)(1) provides that
the aid may be used for

50. The World Court held that:
[The support given by the United States, up to the end of September, 1984, to the
military and paramilitary activities of the Contras in Nicaragua, by financial support,
training, supply of-weapons, intelligence and logistic support constitutes a clear breach
of the principle of non-intervention.
U.S. v. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27, 1986).
The Court also held that the United States had violated the customary international law
prohibition against the threat or use of force by directly attacking Nicaragua in several instances,
and by arming and training the Contras. Rowles, Nicaragua v.the United Stare: Itues of Law
and Policy, 20:4 INT'L LAw, 1274, 1276 (1986); citing U.S. v. Nicaragua, paras. 80, 227, 228,
239-42.
51. Military Construction Act, fupra note 1.
52. The bill defines the Contras as "all groups . . . which are committed to work together
for democratic national reconciliation in Nicaragua" but restricts funding to those groups that
"respect international standards of conduct and refrain from violations of human rights or from
other criminal acts." Id. § 204. The Contras include major forces such as the United Nicaraguan
Opposition ("UNO") which represents the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, the Indian-Creole Alliance KISAN and "other democratic resistance elements." These include non-UNO aligned organizations such as the Southern Opposition Bloc
and the Indian resistance force known as Misurasata.
53 See N.Y. Times, June 26, 1986, at Al. col. 5.
54. The term "Central American democracies" includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras. Military Construction Act, supra note 1, § 205(a).
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(A) humanitarian assistance... ;
(B) logistics advice and assistance;
(C) support for democratic political and diplomatic
activities;
(D) training, services, equipment and supplies for radio communications, collection, and utilization of intelligence, logistics, and small-unit skills, tactics and operations; and
(E) equipment and supplies necessary for defense against air
attacks. 5"

Title II authorizes the release to the Contras of $ 100 million of Defense
Department funds,' 6 $70 million for military aid and $30 million for
"humanitarian" aid. 57 Further provisions of Title II establish mechanisms for the accounting of Contra aid expenditures, 58 the creation of
a Commission on Central American Negotiations, 9 and the requirement that the President report to Congress periodically on progress
towards peace in Nicaragua. 60
55. Id. § 211(bXl).
56. Id. § 206(a).
57. Id. § 208(a). Humanitarian assistance "means the provision of food, clothing, medicine,
and other humanitarian assistance, and it does not include the provision of weapons, weapons
systems, ammunition, or other equipment, vehicles, or material which can be used to inflict
serious bodily harm or death." International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-83, 99 Star. 190 (1985). The United States' concept of humanitarian assistance
can be quite flexible. On June 21, 1986, the New York Times described alleged Contra "humanitarian" purchases of 62,120 belts, 6,000 pairs of suspenders, 53,576 pairs of boots, and 50,000
canteens-All for 15-20,000 Contras. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1986, at 1, col. 1. An editorial
on September 13, 1986, criticized the State Department for denying Oxfam America permission
to send agricultural equipment and supplies to Nicaragua. The New York Times alleged that the
State Department rejected the shipment after determining that two chain saws, mimeograph
machines and spare parts for farm equipment could be used for military purposes by the
Sandinistas. N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1986 § I at 26, col. 1.
58. Military Construction Act, stipra note 1, § 207.
59. Id. § 213. This section establishes a five-member bipartisan commission which is "to
monitor and report on the efforts of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance to coordinate and
reform and on the status of any negotiations on the peace, stability, and security of Central
America." Id.
60. Id. § 211. This section provides that the President shall report to Congress before each
of the last two installments of aid are released. The President is requested to comment on (1) the
status of Nicaraguan peace negotiations; (2) the accountability of Contra expenditures;
(3) violations of human rights by the Sandinistas and the Contras; and (4) efforts of the Contras
to broaden their political base. Sections 203 and 216 of Title II prohibit American government
personnel, including employees, agents and soldiers of the Armed forces and the CIA, from
providing "any training or other service or otherwise participat[ing] directly or indirectly in the
provision of any assistance to the Contras . . . within those land areas of Honduras and Costa
Rica which are within 20 miles of the border with Nicaragua." Id. § 216. Section 216(b)
exempts from this prohibition any United States officer, employee or agent in Nicaragua or
within 20 miles of its border for the purpose of carrying out inspections, investigations or audits
with respect to Contra aid. Id.
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The push for the Act's passage began in early 1986.61 On March
21, however, the House voted 222-210 against the bill. 6 On March
24, 1986, Administration officials reported that 1,500 Nicaraguan
troops had entered Honduran territory. Honduran officials initially
denied reports of the incursion, much as they had denied or downplayed the more than 100 cross-border attacks by Contra and Sandinista forces over the previous few years. 63 Later, however, Honduras
confirmed the invasion. 4 Opponents accused the Reagan Administration of politically manipulating a normal incident between Nicaragua
and Honduras. 65 Nevertheless, conservatives seized upon the incursion
as proof that the President was correct.6
Although the alleged Nicaraguan incursion into Honduras may have
precipitated the Senate's approval of the bill, the Senate debate also
focused on the role of negotiation, specifically the merits of the Contadora process, in resolving the conflict in Nicaragua. Those who
opposed passage of the bill supported the Contadora process as an
alternative to military action. 67 After President Reagan agreed to
withhold aid while the United States attempted to initiate negotiations
between the Contras and the Sandinistas,6 Congress approved the bill.
The issue of human rights and of the moral and legal responsibility
of support to the Contras occupied a crucial place in congressional
consideration of the aid bill. The Senate and House heard Reagan
Administration officials and leaders of human rights organizations
61. See Hardr, The Reagan Administration's Battlefor Contra Aid, 10 T-i FLETcHER FORUM
291 (1986). The Administration suggested, in a manner reminiscent of McCarthy red scare
tactics, that voting against the aid bill would be caving into communism. See Buchanan, The
Contras Need Our Help, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 1986, at A19. ("With the vote on Contra aid, the
Democratic Party will reveal whether it stands with Ronald Reagan and the resistance-or
Daniel Ortega and the communists.")
62. 32 CONG. REc. D316 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1986).
63. See Smolowe, Pouncingon a Transgressor, TiME, Apr. 7, 1986, at 24.
64. See Martz, Echoes of an Old War, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7, 1986, at 34.
65. See This Week With David Brinkley, (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 30, 1986) Sen. Jim
Sasser (D-Tenn.): "[Cjynics would say that this is an effort on the part of the Administration to
gin up support for their effort to get $100 million in Contra aid." ABC News White House
Correspondent Sam Donaldson: "Is that what you say?" Sen. Sasser: "I suspect that's the case.").
66. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at A6, col. 1. As a result of the alleged incursion, the
Democrats lost much of their unity in opposing Contra aid. See Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1986, at
A12.
67. See 132 CONG. REc. S3,456-7 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) said the United States should follow the Contadora nations'
repeated call to end support for the Contras and for a negotiated solution, for while "[t]he
the people of Nicaragua-the true democratic
Contras will never topple the Sandinistas
opposition-just might."
68. See Hardt, supra note 61, at 292. Talks between Managua and Washington would be
held only after Managua began negotiations with the Contras. The final assessment of the
diplomatic mission's success and the power to release the remaining military aid, however, lay
with the President rather than with the Congress.
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testify about abuses on both sides of the Nicaraguan conflict. Congressional reaction to reports of human rights abuses appear throughout
the Act, and a significant three percent of the $100 million granted
to the Contras is earmarked for human rights work. 69
The Administration asserted that its position on human rights was
in part the impetus behind the request for Contra aid. In its presentations to the Senate and House, -the Administration focused on human
rights abuses by the Nicaraguan government, specifically the relocation
of the Miskito Indians, the harassment of the Roman Catholic Church,
civil rights and liberties
censorship of the media, and restrictions on
70
established under the State of Emergency.
Richard Shifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, characterized the Administration's stance towards human rights as one which opposes specific human rights violations wherever they occur and at the same time works in the long
term to strengthen democracy in order to ensure human rights. 71 One
commentator described President Reagan's human rights policy as an
"assertive campaign on behalf of democratic values . . . conceived as
a deliberate shift away from the Carter emphasis on torture, disap72
pearances and absence of due process ....
The Act seeks to promote human rights in Nicaragua in the form
of democratic institutions. For example, section 203(a)(4 ) declares that
United States policy towards Nicaragua is to be based upon, among
other things, Sandinistan progress towards alleviation of "internal
repression and lack of opportunity for the exercise of civil and political
rights which would allow the people of Nicaragua to have a meaningful
voice . . . through participation in regularly scheduled free73 and fair
elections and the establishment of democratic institutions.
Much congressional testimony reflected the Reagan emphasis on
civil and political rights. Witnesses testified to the resettlement of
74
the Atlantic Coast Miskito Indians to Sandinista-controlled camps,
the harassment of the Catholic Church, 75 the Sandinistan prohibition
of broadcasts of masses, the shutdown of the Church's radio station,
the Church's criticism of the sectarian nature of the Sandinista
69. See Military Construction Act, supra note 1, § 208(b). See also supra Part I, discussing
the ANPDH.
70. See generally 1986 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 2, at 569.
71. See id. at 3.
72. Jacoby, The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 1066, 1075 (1986).
73. Military Construction Act, supra note 1, § 203.
74. See Review of President's Report on Assistance to the NicaraguanOpposition: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1985) (statement by Elliott Abrams) [hereinafter Review of President'sReport].
75. For a discussion of the role of the Catholic Church in the Nicaraguan conflict, see
O'Brien, God and Man in Nicaragua, THE ATLANTIC. Aug.. 1986, at 50.
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government 76 and the Sandinistan repression of free speech. 77 The
testimony of non-governmental human rights organizations ("NGOs")
reflected a broader vision of human rights. NGO representative testified to Sandinistan human rights violations such as torture, cruel
and degrading treatment, detainment in clandestine prisons, rape of
women prisoners, denial of fair public trials and arbitrary interference
with privacy. 78
While the Administration asserted that a concern for human rights
was behind its request for aid, its reaction to accusations of Contra
abuses was equivocal. When confronted with a 1985 report 79 documenting incidents of Contra abuses of Nicaraguan civilians, Assistant
Secretary of State Abrams dismissed it as "unreliable," and "deliberately inaccurate." 80 When not doubting reports to the contrary, the
Administration insisted that the Contras were acting in good faith to
improve their rights record by establishing a human rights organization within the United Nicaraguan Opposition ("UNO"). s5 Much
Senate testimony, however, contradicted the Administration's characterization of the Contras' human rights record. 8 2 One published report
recommended that Congress not approve further assistance to the
Contras unless it was determined that consistent human rights violations ceased. 8 3 Neither position fully persuaded Congress; provisions
Administration to submit to
of the Appropriations Act require the
4
.
conduct
Contra
on
reports
Congress
76. See 132 CONG. REc. E2,235 (daily ed. June 24, 1986) (statement of Rep. Hamilton);
see also id. at E2,240 (statement of Rep. Broomfield) (supporting President Reagan's reasons for
aiding the Contras).
77. The President stated that the major Nicaraguan newspaper, La Prenta-"whose courage
pages censored
and determination had inspired so much of the Nicaraguan revolution-found its
and suppressed." Id. at E2,240.
78. See 132 CONG. REC. S8,783-9 (daily ed. June 26, 1986) (Amnesty International Prepared
Statement on Nicaragua).
79. See D. Fox & M. GLENNON, ABUSES AGAINST CIVILIANS BY COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES
OPERATING IN NICARAGUA (1985).
80. Review of President's Report, supra note 74, at 22 (statement of Elliot Abrams). Abrams

continued: "The level of human rights abuses by the FDN [Nicaraguan Democratic Front] is
open to doubt. The Sandinistas have made a big deal about it. Investigations like the Brody
Report indicate a lot of that is lies. I don't think it is that big a problem." Id. at 34.
81. AMERICAS WATCH 1986, supra note 4, at 17. In 1985, at the urging of the Reagan

Administration, UNO established a human rights office in Costa Rica that operated on United
States funds. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
FOR 1985, at 635-36 (1986).
82. 132 CONG. REC. S8777 (daily ed. June 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Harken: "The
witnesses testifying at the . . . hearing were from organizations which represent the full range
of views on this topic, and which provided an objective assessment of the human rights situation
in Nicaragua."). For a complete list of the witnesses' credentials as given to the Senators, see
id. at S8,778.

83. See Fox & GLENNON rupra note 79, at 23 (accusing the Administration of hiding behind
a "veil of intentional ignorance")
84. See, e.g., Military Construction Act

supra note 1. § 204 (stating that no assistance
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The Reagan Administration brought the subject of human rights
into the debate over Contra aid, calling for military support for
principles of "democracy and human rights.""5 While the Administration's characterization of human rights was not the same as that
used by opponents of Contra aid, neither was it the sole conception
of human rights which appeared in the text of the enacted bill.
Opponents of the bill argued for rights to human integrity and against
Contra abuses; the Administration spoke mainly of rights to vote,
publish and pray. Congress responded with an Act which, to a certain
extent, incorporates the two conceptions. It calls for military pressure
for Nicaraguan political reform and sets up institutional and procedural
controls over Contra actions regarding human rights. The result is an
unusual hybrid--an Act which in one section gives weapons and in
another appropriates $3 million for human rights work. The Reagan
Administration, in pushing for aid for the Contras, used the subject
of human rights in a way calculated to promote a particular foreign
policy objective, rather than in a way which seeks to promote human
rights as an end.
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ranks any individual
authorized by the Act "may be provided to any group that retains in its
who has been found to engage in ... gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights . . . ."). Section 211 (d) states that final installments of aid will be released only if the

President determines that the Contras 'have agreed to and are beginning to implement.., the
elimination of human rights abuses." Section 214(3) requires that Reagan submit a report to
Congress which includes "a discussion of alleged human rights violations by the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance and the Government of Nicaragua, including a statement of the steps
taken by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance to remove from their ranks any individuals who
have engaged in human rights abuses."
85. Ironically, on June 27, two days after the House passed the Contra aid bill, the International Court of Justice ruled that the United States had been violating a number of fundamental
principles of international law by interfering in the internal affairs of Nicaragua. Specifically,
the World Court ruled that the United States' concern for Nicaraguan human rights violations
were not adequate to justify military intervention.
(W]hile the United States might form its own appraisal of the situation as to respect
for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate method
to monitor or ensure such respect . . . [Tihe protection of human rights, a strictly
humanitarian objective, cannot be compatible with the mining of ports, the destruction
of oil installations, or again with the training, arming and equipping of the Contras.
U.S. v. Nicaragua, supra note 50, para. 268. For further discussion ofthe World Court judgment,
see Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (merits), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 77,

(H. Maier ed. 1987); Rowles, supra note 50.

